Abstract
This paper attempts to answer the question of whether digital terrorism, also known as cyberterrorism, exists. The paper defines terrorism both in the conventional and digital sense. It then gives a short history of conventional terrorism, dating back two thousand years and ending with the terrorist activities in several third-world nations. The essay then discusses digital terrorism, highlighting the Estonian, Georgian, and Ukrainian cyber-attacks. The work concludes that digital terrorism does indeed exist, but that the future is uncertain in the sense that future cyber-attacks will probably not resemble past attacks as the technology advances.
Author Contributions
Copyright© 2020
Donald L. Buresh.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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Introduction
According to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, terrorism is “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion” In contrast, digital terrorism, or cyberterrorism as it is also known, is a controversial term. Cyberterrorism can be narrowly defined as disruptive attacks by recognized terrorist organizations against computer systems with the intent of generating an alarm, panic, or the physical disruption of the information system, or it can be defined to encompass cybercrime The question that this essay is attempting to answer is whether digital terrorism or what is commonly known as cyber terrorism exists. When questions regarding the existence of a notion are asked, the answer depends on its definition. According to the definitions of terrorism discussed above, the purpose of terrorism is to make individuals of an organization or a government fearful by disrupting the processes that operate within that organization or government or by killing or maiming those individuals If the killing and maiming of people is an inherent characteristic of cyber terrorism, there would be seemingly little or no difference between conventional terrorism and cyberterrorism. In cyber terrorism, the means of conducting the attack has shifted from a direct kinetic attack to a cyber-attack, where the kinetic effects are a consequence of the cyber-attack In contrast to digital or cyber terrorism, conventional terrorist attacks are relatively infrequent. Most people are aware of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 Another conventional terrorist attack occurred on March 11, 2004, where 191 people were killed, and more than 1,800 people were injured in Madrid, Spain The word “terror” is derived from the Latin verb “tersere” which then evolved into the word “terrere” Terrorism is a tactic and began thousands of years ago. During the 1st Century C.E., Jewish Zealots in Judea rebelled against Roman rule During the French Revolution of 1789 and the years that followed before the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte, terrorism took on a whole new meaning. The Parisian Reign of Terror lasted from mid-1793 and ended with the fall of Maximilian Robespierre in July 1794 In Europe, there were the Revolutions of 1848, beginning in France in February of that year and spreading across the continent. These revolutions were fundamentally bourgeois revolutions with the goal of removing the old monarchical structures and creating independent and democratic nation-states In August 1914, World War I broke out After World War II ended in August 1945, it seemed that the world was tired of war The rise in cyber-terrorism paralleled the growth of the Internet in the 1990s Through cyberterrorism against governments, private servers, networks, or other electronic devices, hackers can damage systems using viruses, worms, or Trojans, launching denial-of-service (“DoS”) attacks, defacing websites, or even demanding that governments or companies pay substantial ransoms Global terror networks that disrupt major sites by initiating public nuisances or stopping Internet traffic; International cyberterrorists accessing and then disabling or modifying signals to military technology; Cyberterrorists targeting critical infrastructure systems such as a water treatment plant or an electrical grid; or Cyberespionage that carried out by governments or private organizations to spy on intelligence communications Cyberterrorists can employ a variety of methods to attack a network. They may access a network or a server and then wait for an opportune time to strike The defenses against cyberterrorism vary depending on the type of attack. The installation of effective anti-virus software, as well as periodically checking systems for the presence of malware, can effectively mitigate cyber-attacks In the past decade, there have been three significant cyberterrorism acts that have been extensively covered in the literature. They include the Estonian cyber-attack, the Georgian cyber-attack, and the Ukrainian cyber-attack. These examples were selected because the cyber-attacks affected large portions of the infrastructures of the countries under consideration. The examples reflect the magnitude of the harm that has occurred in the past, and can occur in the present and future. The Estonian cyber-attack began on Friday, April 27, 2007, and ended on Friday, May 18, 2007. The attack lasted for three weeks In Estonia, there was almost universal access to the Internet. The government promoted information technology to increase the administrative ability to foster communications between Estonian citizens and their government. The Estonian government became virtually paperless in 2001 The cyber attackers employed three methods against the Estonian government and Estonian institutions. The attacks consisted of DoS attacks, Distributed Denial of Service (“DDoS”) attacks, website defacement, attacks against Data Name Servers (“DNS”), and mass email comment spam. The attacks of April 27 through April 29 consisted of defacing government websites. These attacks were reasonablystraightforward using the In the second phase of the attack, the first wave began on May 04, involving intense and precise attacks against websites and data name servers by using botnets, routing the attacks from proxy servers in other countries. The second wave lasted from May 09 through May 11. In Russia, May 09 is national holiday Victory Day, signifying the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. During the second phase, the DDoS attacks increased by 150 percent against government websites, lasting from May 09 to May 10. Hansapank, the largest Estonian bank, was also affected by the DDoS attacks The third wave involved the hijacking of 85,000 Estonian computers, taking place from noon until midnight on May 15. The website for SEB EestiÜhispank, Estonia’s second-largest commercial bank, lasted for about 1.5 hours for Estonian customers and longer for customers outside the country. On May 18 or the fourth wave, both government and banking websites experienced DDoS attacks. The source of the attacks was traced to computers in 178 different countries. The attacks were politically motivated by individuals who were following instructions on Russian-language websites. The second phase of the attack appeared to be centrally controlled. There were only a few individuals that took credit for the attacks. The Russian government denied involvement in the cyber-attacks The cyber-attack had a noticeable effect on the Estonian economy, which affected commerce, industry, and governance that relied on information and communications technology (“ICT”) infrastructure. Bank, media companies, government institutions, and small to medium businesses were all affected. The societal effect was that communication to public administration was significantly hampered along with the information flow to other countries. A side-effect was that the legitimate Internet traffic was clogged. There was substantial technical response employed, where international cooperation both from the European Union (“E.U.”) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”). There was also increasing public awareness as Estonia worked with other countries to bring cybercriminals to justice The lessons learned were manifold. The Estonian cyberattack raised international awareness that cyber-attacks were new forms of criminal activity in an information society. The attacks accentuated the need for mutual criminal assistance on an international level. The challenge was to appreciate that cyber-attacks have international implications affecting not only one country but also a global region or even the whole planet itself The Georgian cyber-attack began on Friday, August 08, 2008, and ended on Thursday, August 28, 2008. The attack lasted for three weeks. The attack was precipitated by an armed conflict between the Russian Federation and the country of Georgia over South Ossetia. In 2008, the Internet had a low penetration rate of 7 percent of the population. At the time, Georgia was not heavily dependent on IT-infrastructure. There were limited options to connect to the Internet via land routes, where the connections that did exist heavily depended on Russia There were several methods employed in the Georgian cyberattack. DoS and DDoS were involved, including the distribution of malicious M.S. batch scripts whose instructions exploited Structured Query Language (“SQL”) vulnerabilities The effects of the Georgian attacks were limited because of the kinetic military conflict between Russia and Georgia. Because of the lack of communication technology in Georgia at the time, the transmission of information to the outside world was constrained, particularly during the beginning of the conflict. Main communications operations were severely affected because most of the Georgian communications lines passed through Russia. Internet services had to be relocated to servers outside the country. National Community Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) assistance came from other countries The Georgian academic center CERT mitigated the attack. It assumed the role of the Georgian national CERT at the time of the attack. There was a state-mandated blockage on Russian websites to control the flow of information and to free up bandwidth. Services to servers were relocated to other countries. The national CERTs from other countries were involved in helping Georgia overcome the cyber-attack One of the significant lessons learned from the Georgian cyberattacks was the applicability to the Law of Armed Conflicts (“LOAC”). The right of a country to employ force against another state depends on the actions of the other state. The remedy must be proportionate to the threat and the harm incurred. The problem with the Georgian cyberattack was that it was difficult to estimate the direct effects of the attacks. Because the Georgian population was not highly dependent on Internet services, the cyber-attacks were not sufficiently serious to result in serious economic damage or human suffering. Thus, the application of the LOAC to the Georgian cyberattacks seems problematic at best and irrelevant and immaterial at worst. The challenges are that new approaches are needed to provide effective legal remedies, and that continued national information communication technologies (“ICT”) are essential On December 23, 2015, Prykapattyapblenergo, a Ukrainian regional electricity distribution company, stated that the service outages experienced by its customers were because of a third party’s illegal entry into company’s computer and supervisory control and data acquisition (“SCADA”) systems The Ukrainian news agencies conducted interviews and concluded that a foreign government had remotely controlled the SCADA electrical distribution system. It was initially estimated that the outage only affected 80,000 customers. However, it was later discovered that the electrical distribution grids for Chernivtsioblenergo and Kyivoblenerogo were affected. In total, 225,000 customers lost power due to the attack. These cyber-attacks in Ukraine were the first attacks that were publicly acknowledged to have resulted in power outages There were a variety of capabilities that were demonstrated by the Ukrainian attacks, including spear-phishing emails, variations on It is not clear why these three oblenergoswere targeted. Lee et al gave the following possible decision factors: Common systems and configurations; Impact duration estimates; Existing capabilities would achieve the desired results; Risk level was reasonable; and Access to act within the environment The lessons learned are legion. The spear-phishing employed social engineering techniques to target the Ukrainian oblenergosneeds to whitelist extensively, identifying users that are given the specific privilege, service, mobility, access, or recognition. Because The question originally posed by this essay was whether digital terrorism existed. The evidence presented above indicates not only that digital terrorism exists, but also that conventional terrorism is still rearing its ugly head. However, it is not the existence of digital terrorism, or more commonly known as cyberterrorism, that is the concern of both governments and individuals alike. Rather, the issue that seems to dominate the consciousness of society is: What will the next cyber-attack look like? Will it resemble the Estonian cyber-attack, the Georgian cyber-attack, or the Ukrainian cyber-attack? Will it be like when the Chinese stole security clearance information on 22.1 million Americans with security clearances? Will it be similar to the alleged Russian attack on the Democratic National Convention (“DNC”) servers? Will it be comparable to the recent GitHub cyber-attack, where the site experienced an incoming attack traffic rate of 1.3 terabytes per second? Or, will the next major attack be so new and unique that organizational defenses will be helpless to prevent it, mitigate it, or minimize the damages? This is what concerns the public today. The good news, or rather the short answer, is that very shortly any new attack will probably be analogous to one or more of the cyber-attacks discussed above. For example, if a cyber-attack were to occur tomorrow, there would be little or no change in the technology. The attack would probably very closely resemble past attacks. The cyber-attack would probably use existing available technology. The technology would likely be computer towers, computer notebooks, and cell phones. There would be almost no change in the availability of the Internet of Things (“IoT”) (e.g., computers in automobiles, televisions, refrigerators, microwave ovens, etc.). Thus, a cyber-attack would probably be akin to previous attacks, depending on the existing hardware and software employed by the attackers and available at the target site. However, in five, 10, or 20 years, the situation may dramatically change. The technology in this future period will probably be entirely different from the technology around us today. First, there is the IoT. Smart devices are being marketed and sold to consumers at a rapid pace Stuxnet and its variations will play a dramatic role in future cyber-attacks. When Stuxnet was used by the United States government a decade ago to disrupt Iranian centrifuges, a physical machine was involved that stopped working correctly When looking 20 years into the future, human beings will probably be physically connected to the Internet via nanotechnology that is implanted into their bodies Thus, a future cyber-attack depends on the date and time that the attack occurs as well as the technology involved. Without this information, it is probably impossible to predict with any precision or accuracy what a future cyber-attack will resemble. It seems that the only impediment to a precise and accurate prediction is the imagination of a sage or a prophet. A prospective attacker will have no such limitation. He or she is already well aware that the future belongs to them.
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